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Industrial Policies in a Changing World:
Brazilian Transition to the New Paradigm
1- Introduction
This paper aimsatdiscussing the role ofgovernmentpolicies
for industrial and technological development based on the
Brazilian experience. Rapid technological change, globalization
and the industrial restructuring are shaping new forms of
government intervention worldwide. There is a growing
recognition among academics and policy makers that
protectionism is no longer possible in the new international
order, since multilateral agreements concerningtariffand non-
tariff barriers, industrial proprerty and transborder dataflows
are limiting the freedom of individual states to shelter their
industry and technology. Technology innovation itself also
helped to reduce barriers since telecomunications networks
and cheap international air transporthave substantially reduced
the effectiveness of governmentcontrols. As Reich (1992:7) put
it, “even items that governments wishto preventfrom getting in
(drugs,illegal immigrants)or out(secretweapons) doso anyway”.
Following the example of other Latin American countries,
like Mexico and Argentina, Brazil is shifting from protectionism
to liberal economic policies. Althoughit is true that Brazil has
been much slower than its neighbours in adopting a more
orthodox andradical adjustmentto curb inflation,it is also true
that the country is well advanced in implementing liberal
policies concerning industry and technology. This includes
pursuing a wide privatization program, removing existing non-
tariff barriers and reducing importtariffs, ending restrictions
on foreign investment and profit remittance, and introducing
amore liberal law concerning patents and industrial property.
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Also, Brazil has given up protecting key sectors such as
information technology. The government seemsto be losing
credibility and the capacity to formulate and implement new
industrial policies. Consequently, it passively adopts liberal
formulasofthe kind suggested by international agencies such
as the World Bank and the IMF.
My hypothesis is that while policy shifis were badly needed,
a “hands-off” policy does not represent a sound alternative
policy for industrial development. The new techno-economic
paradigm requires building up new competitive advantages in
order to boost competitiveness in an increasingly competitive
world. In most developing countries marketfailures cannot be
supersededwithoutgovernmentintervention to create adequate
conditions for development. The successful strategies adopted
by Taiwan and Korea to develop key industrial sectors are
examples of “hands-on”, rather than “hands-off” policies.
Thepastpolicies ofBrazil produced an impressive change in
the structure of the Brazilian economy, giving support to
industrial developmentand diversification, despite high costs,
measured in terms ofa substantial external debt, high inflation
and uneaven incomedistribution. But the transition from one
paradigm to anotherproducedamismatchbetweengovernment
policies and the need to restructure the local industry. Both
governmentand industry were slow to understand the need to
adopt new technologies in order to compete in international
markets. The local market remained sheltered from foreign
competition even afterthe debtcrises obstructed growth potential
in the internal market.
Despite negative impacts of the new paradigms on existing
industries, due to the Schumpeterian process of “creative
destruction”, windowsofopportunitiesalso opened fordeveloping
countries which had already achieved a certain degree of
industrial and tecnhological development(Perez, 1983). However
the exploitation of these opportunities requires adequate
governmentpolicies and firm strategies. The new Paradigm is
knowledge intensive, a resource built through long term
educational and research efforts. Also, it requires the
development of a physical and technological infra-structure
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such as telecommunications, transport and a basic technology
network to support industry’s needs.The state itself must also
undergo a process of “creative destruction” aiming at reducing
bureaucracy and acquire the capabilities and the flexibility
needed to cope with a fast changing environment.
This paper analyses the changingrole of the state and the
basis for new industrial strategies bearing in mind three key
aspects: first, it considers recent changes in development
theory and policies, including structuralism, liberalism and
neo-Schumpeterianism.It is not intended to provide a review
but simply discuss major pitfalls in both structuralism and
liberalism and suggest that alternative approaches more
adaptable to the continuously changing environment and
specificities of different countries are needed. Second,weraise
some challenges proposedbythenewtechno-economicparadigm
for developing countries. This includes reviewing the process of
globalization, technology andorganizational change. Third, we
briefly analyse the historical developmentofBrazilian industrial
and technology policies from World War II to the present.
Dealing with this issueis a difficult task. A major analytical
problem is to separate industrial policies, based on sectoral
resource allocation, from macroeconomic policies which back
up industrial development. The analysis is more directly
associated with those aspects of industrial and technological
policies which play a role in explaining Brazilian industrial
strengths and weeknesses.
2. Swing in the Development Model: From Structuralism to Neo-
Liberalism
Latin American industrialization was deeply rooted in the
structuralist though which emerged from the UN's Economic
Comission for Latin America’s (ECLA) “dependence school”.
The central idea was that market imperfections and new forms
of colonialism led to an unfavourable international division of
labour where developing countries specialized in raw material
and foodstufwhile importing more value-added manufactured
goods from developed countries. This situation was considered
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to be detrimental to economic developmentin the periphery
since terms of trade tended to favour manufactured goods.
Thus, developing countries must pursue industrialization,
leaving behind their dependence on primary goods.
ECLA’s view was that developing countries’ economic
structuresweredifferent from those pervailing in industrialized
countries, In particular, the market in developing economies
was consideredto be sociallyless efficient in allocatingresources.
The possibilities of autonomous industrial developmentin the
peripherywasviewed pessimisticallybecauseofits subservient
role within the international economy. Within this context,
accumulation and expansionofcapital cannotfind its essential
dynamic componentwithin the peripherybecauseofthe absence
of capital goods andfinancial sectors, the import of technology
and penetration by foreign multinationals. Consequently,
government intervention was considered to be essential to
promote both efficiency and equity.
These ideas justified governmentintervention in the largest
LatinAmerican countries, aiming at boosting industrialization.
The resulting import-substitution process, based on selective
protectionism against foreign imports, bore fruit in providing
the basis for a wide experienceofindustrialization. By the mid-
sixties, the two largest South American countries already
showed a manufacturing sector responding to almosta third of
their gross domestic product. This compare with the relative
distribution of the two mostindustrialized countries in the
world - Japan and Germany- where manufaturingshare ofGDP
was 30% and 32% respectively (see table 1). Thus, the term
“semi-industrialized” and “industrializing” are barely adequate
to describe the pattern ofeconomic specialization ofthese Latin
American countries.
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Table 1
Distribution of Domestic Product (percent)
 
Country Industry Manufacturing
1965 1989 1965 1989
Argentina 42 33 33 35
Brazil 33 43 26 31
Mexico 27 32 20 23
Korea 25 44 18 26
Japan — 33 34 34 30
Germany (FRG) 53 37 40 32
 
Source: World Bank (1991) pp 209
In Latin America the “developmentalism” ideology pushed
the process ofimport substitution ahead from consumer goods
in the 50s and 60sto intermediary products in the 70s. In the
early eighties, the external debt crises which provoked the
Mexican moratorium halted the developmentprocess. Foreign
capital was no longer available and servicing the existing debt
became a major problem for most countries in the region.
Mexico and Brazil answered this challenge by deepening the
import substitution process aiming at creating trade surplus to
service the debt. Since exports could not be substantially
increased in the short run, both countries decided to increase
import restrictions. Brazil, in particular, did not undertake
furtherstepsto ajust the economyto foreign currency shortage.
The resultwasadecline inGDP anda risein inflation. Thecrisis
openedthefield for criticism of aboutthe role ofthe state in the
economy.
From the 80s developmenttheories andpolicieswere strongly
influenced by neo-liberalism, which ended up as a hegemonic
paradigm in most countries and internationalforums. According
to Schmitz e Cassiolato (1992a:6), although the neo-liberal
school wasalready influencial in some industrially advanced
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countries for several decades, “in the debate on developing
coutries neo-liberalism has been a reaction to structuralism,
the dominantintellectual paradigm ofthe years 1950-80”. This
“counter-revolution in development theory and policy” (1)
basically rejected stale intervention on the grounds that market
imperfections were better than imperfect states. Neo-liberals
believe that long-run growth can be maximized through the
pursuit of short-run allocative efficiency as determined by
market prices.
Neo-liberal policies are rooted in neo-classical economic
theory. This has been considered particularly inadequate to
deal with the process of change (Possas, 1989) becauseofits
static nature, where elements of analysis are at rest and
economic forces in equilibrium. At best it can compare two
different positions in a static way. Another majorlimitation of
neo-classical theory is the fact that it does not incorporate non-
economic factors which play a key role in the development
process. The technology problem is reduced to a mere matterof
choice since analysis is based onthecriteria of microeconomic
optimization in the face of pre-determined technological
alternatives.AsSchmitzand Cassiolato (1992:7) putit, “variables
such as technology and human resources which have an
enormousinfluence upon long-run outcomesare relegated toa
category which will lookafter itself’. Recently, however, neo-
liberals began to move away from “static” analysis and to
attribute more importance to non-economic factors such as
globalization in the developmentprocess.
A neo-Schumpeterian analysis, by constrast, starts from
Schumpeter’s central idea that technological change plays a
fundamental role in the dynamicsofeconomic activities. Itis analternative theoretical framework that has been developedsince the late 1970s to cope with the inadequacies of theexisting analysis ofeconomic developmentbasedeither on neo-
classical or structuralist and marxist theories. Two mainapproachescan beidentified in the neo-Schumpeterian analysis
Nelson and Winter's (1982) “evolutionist” approach (inspiredby Darwin's dynamicevolutionofspecies), is based on the ideathat economic changesin a competitive environment stem from
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’ unceasi rocess of search for innovations. These
Deations arethensubmitted to market selectionmechanisms.
It should be noted, however, that the market is not considered
to be the only selection mechanism, since governmentpolicies
andthe strategies of firms also play a keyrole in selecting
ons.
iepeoond approachis the “technological paradigm “, built
upon Schumpeter’s theory of long cycles in economic
development. It shares with the evolutionist approachthebelief
that technological change is the main driving force behind the
transformation of market structures. Freeman et al (1982,
1987), Perez (1983), Perez and Soete (1988) and Dosi (1982,
1984), amongothers, have developed theoretical and analytical
framework to deal with the economic development process
under existing social, technological, and political conditions
both in developed and developing countries. The theory
incorporates previous non-orthodox analyses such as Sylos-
Labini’s oligopolistic market structure and makes an in-depth
analysis of the economic and technical characteristics of
tOened to neo-Schumpeterian theory, according to Schmitz
and Cassiolato (1992:4) is the distinction between different
es of technical change: incremental innovations occur
re or less continuously and are concerned only with the
existing array ofproducts andthe processofproduction; radical
innovations are discontinuouseventswhichcannotbe construed
the cumulative addition of small modifications to existing
or ducts and processbut rather stem from a complete change;
Ow “technological systems” consist of combinations of
innovations which have ramifications for several branches of
the economy; andfinally changes in techno-economicparadigm
are technological (and institutional) transformations that have
suchawide rangeofapplicationsthat they affect the conditions
of production in all sectors of the economy.
Table 2 summarizes the major differences between neo-
liberaland neo-Schumpeterian approaches towards technology-
intensive industries in developing countries.
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Focus of analysis Short-run cosis Interactive learning
Conceptof technology Technology asa Technology as tacit
tradeable recipe knowledge noteasily :
or input transferred *
Innovation process Separateness of Synergy of producer
and
production and diff- user
usion of technology
Technical progress Continuous and Continuous and |
cummulative (single- discontinuous (opening |
track race) windowsof
opportunity)
Conceptoflabour Labouras a cost Labouras a resource
Conceptof Product(or price) Structural
competitiveness competitiveness competitiveness
Role of the state Reliance on market Strategic state
forces intervention
Point of entry Late stage Early stage
 
Source: Schmitz and Cassiolato (1992:9).
The presentwaveoftransformation based onmicro
is consideredto be a changein the techno-economic paradigm
sinceit is radically altering the pre-existing “Fordist/Taylorist”paradigm by introducing a new best practice frontier and
setting newefficiency standards. Developing countries are thmostaffected by a changein paradigm asw .€ will see in the
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paradigm there may also exist “windows of opportunity” for
developing countries. At this phase, knowledge is relatively
freely available, since the new scientific and technical principles
ofproduct andprocessinnovation canbe learnedin universities.
Howeverthis is only an entry point, favoured by technological
discontinuity, that must be followed by complementary
investment in R&D infrastructure, skill development and the
establishmentofa close interaction between suppliers and the
users of technology. In order to articulate industry-research
links itis also necessary to build a“nationalsystem ofinnovation”
with country-specific priorities.
The concept of a new techno-economic paradigm has
important implications for development policies. Assuming
that developmentis highly inflenced by key innovations which
are monopolized by a few countries, simplistic neo-classical
assumptions suchas that new technology is equally andfreely
available to all comers are rejected. The theoretical framework
(such as the general equilibrium theory) used by neo-liberals is
completely inadequated to deal with the economic and
competitive dynamic ofthe the late 1900s, as empirical findings
stemming from economics, managementstudies, history and
sociology have proven. Neo-liberals have greatly contributed to
the analysis of government failures, in particular the costs of
intervention, butpaymuchlessserious attention to the analysis
ofmarketfailures. This bias can beidentified, in practice, by the
trend of neo-liberal analysis to ignore successful government
intervention to promote industrialization in high-tech sectors
in East Asian countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
Neo-Schumpeterian theory is seen as a ressurgenceofwork
on what may be termed a structural view or perspective on
economic growth and development (Justman and Teubal,
1990:44). It combines the need to understand structural and
long-run processes with an analysis of market forces.
13
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3- The New Techno-Economic Paradigm, Globalization and
Technological Changes
The New Techno-Economic Paradigm and its Implication for
Developing Countries
As we saw in section 2, the perception of the role of
technological change for economic performance has changed
substantially in recentyears. Achangeinthe “techno-economic
paradigm” may take
a
relatively long time to crystallise and
difuse but it establishes a new trajectory of innovation,
organizational structureoffirms and skill requirements which
the productive sector must conform toif firms wish to remain
competitive. Perez (1983) argues that the developmentofa new
paradigm involves anew “bestpractice” set ofrules and custom
for designers, engineers, entrepreneurs and managers, which
differin manyimportantrespectsfrom thepreviouslyprevailing
paradigm. Sherecognizesthatitis notalways easyforcompanies
and countries to adapt to a change of paradigm and that
depressions representperiods ofmismatchbetweenanemerging
new paradigm and the old institutional framework.
The new techno-economic paradigm is associated with the
development of information technology. In most leading
industrial countries the production and trade of computers
electronic components and telecommunication equipment are
amongthefastest growing sectors. But, as Freeman and Soete
(1990) have shown,the application of this new technology is
nowaffecting, althoughvery unevenly,allothersectors, because
of its actual or potential economic and technical advantages
Since electronic equipment prices are going down and the
technology is becoming more appropriate to user's needs
information technology is diffusing at a fast rate troughout
industry, services and agriculture. This involves a process ofchange in production functions, products, and a new Set of
rules for engineers, managers and entrepreneurs which diffe
widely from the previously existing paradigm.
Sucha changewill affect developing countries in man Ww.
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of raw materials, energy, and basic intermediary goodsis that
the new techno-economic paradigm is information intensive
rather than energy and material intensive. Consequently it
tends to reduce the use of traditional materials such as steel
and other metals as the result of new designs and of the
substitution of new materials for traditional ones. Steel, oil,
copperand other materials accountfor a major share of Latin
America’s exports. This typical early paradigm industry is
competitive in world terms,since it has favorable accessto rich
ore and cheap energy sources and incorporates relatively
modern technology.
As noted earlier (Tigre, 1988) one possible consequenceis a
trend ofdecliningtermsoftrade betweentradionalmanufactured
goods and high technology products. In the late 50's, Raul
Prebish, at that time head of The Economic Commission for
Latin America, showed that the prices of raw material and
foodstuff exported by Latin American countries were declining
in relation to imported manufactured goods. This was dueto
smaller price-elasticity of primary goods in relation to
manufactures, since demandforthese commoditiesweregrowing
more slowly than differentiated, technology intense products.
These findings influenced a range of import substitution
industrialization policies on the continent during the following
20 years. The new techno-economic paradigm renews the
dangerofdeclining termsoftrade between traditional and more
advanced manufactured goods.
A second important potential long-term impact of the new
paradigm on developing coutries is the trend towards opening
up a new “technology gap” between countries. Few countries
were able tosuccessfulydevelopa“nationalsystem ofinnovation”
whichwassuitableforthe newinformation-technologyparadigm,
integrating R&D,design, production, engineeringandmarketing.
The developmentofsuch a system require multi-skill training,
efficient computer networking and collaborative research and
stale supportfor generic technologies, and university-industry
collaboration (Freeman, 1987:73). Few developing countries
have been able to develop a national system of innovation to
supportlocal industry technology upgrading.
15
Textos para Discussao
Dueto its systemical and structural chan
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ges needed,catchin
lagswin establisned technological leaders could be
harder for
Peenen 1987-95 in the new paradigm
than it was before.
loday's tech 7:97) argues thal “it
is no use simply importing
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aswellas the appropriate r iegulations, incentive
eeisinduce innovation and newformeoforganieation
on. This will be furtheranalysedinthe last station
of this paper.
The Process ofEconomic Globalization
The processofeconomic globalization
neeshare ofthe attention ofindustrialanddevcloows ‘nt
Sooosationin recent years. It reflects not only a epment
aaaiiies, and ade, strategi
c alliancesamongf
irmsfromwae, in
tving through regional integration, but also a belief thatweare
world’s politi a transformation
that will rearrange th * the
resp he“s ne econ mics
i the coming century. A
e
“there will ieobalization trend goes as
far as to claimthat
corporations, no Proacts
or technologies, no nati a
l
oodonal ec , national industries. There will no lo
onal
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barriers ar ve aly Man ever before
. Capital controls and trade
Daons e|being reducedall
over the world and, in parti
trade
foreign invest used to pursue cautious poli
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like Latin America cerning
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quently trade) has beenmuchfacilitated b ation (and
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to upgradetechaiogy”(WaiSOtRemation thatcan
beNeed
enoughevidenceto prove thatthe worldOveeisbecommngin
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moreinterlinked. Rather, globalization seemstobe restricted to
certain regions and products. Also, as the evidence provided
below suggests, the benefits of global integration have been
harvested by few developed and developing countries, which
succeded in developing the capabilities to absorb, difuse and
furtherdevelop the technology. There are three main arguments
supporting this approach:
i) Tradegrowth tend to concentrate inacertain numberofsectors.
International trade is growing in food and manufactured
products butnot in other primary goodslike fuels, metals and
minerals. Even in manufactured goods, growthratesare smaller
in the 80s than they were in the 60s and 70s(seetable 3).
 
Table 3
Growth of Export (average annual percentage change)
Country and 1965/73 1973/80 1980/87 1987/89
commodidy group
World 9.2 4.9 3.6 5.1
Primary goods 6.9 2.8 1.9 1.4
Food 4.9 7.0 4.1 6.3 (1)
Fuels 9.8 0.3 -1.2 0.8 (1)
Non-food primary 3.7 4.1 2.5 -2.6 (1)
Metals & minerals 7.3 9.1 1.6 -4.4 (1)
Manufacturers 10.7 6.2 4.2 5.9
 
(1) 1987 and 1988 only (average)
Source: World Bank
The stagnationin world trade ofprim oodsis i
with the decline of termsoftrade. Commodity priceshavebeen
falling since the 1970s and volatility in these markets pos
serious problemsfor primary producers (WB, 1991:106) 8 ‘
anothertrend, stemmingfrom thediffusi noeon of the new t :
economic paradigm,is likely to reduce the export volumes
18
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many commodities. New technologies are usually energy and
material-saving. They reduce the use of traditional materials
such as steel and other metals because ofnew designs and the
substitution of materials as mentioned before. New materials
like optical-fibers, carbon-steel andfine ceramicsaresuccessful
examples ofsubstitutes for metals. These materials allow more
control over physical conformation (weight, resistance,
proprieties), production processes (availability, costs,
localization) and environmental impacts.Also, the trend ofnew
products incorporating microelectronics inputs or designed
and produced with the aid ofcomputersis to save materials and
energy.
Anew techno-economic paradigm usually involves clusters
of key technologies which share the characteristics of rapidly
falling costs, widespread availabilityand potential forapplication
throughout the economy. The development of new key
technologiessuch as microelectronics gaverise to new industries
and revigorated existing industries which incorporated it.
Consequently, trade is growing mainly in technology intensive
productswhere competitiveness is associatedwith performance
and quality variables related to design, technical services and
marketing rather than low prices. Since the 1960s, evidence
hasbeen collected (Hufbauer, 1966; Freeman, 1987) pointing to
the conclusion thatthere is a clear-cut relationship between
trade performance and innovative leadership.
This, of course, has negative implications for developing
countries which cannot compete for technology leadership or
even follow suit within a reasonable lag in clusters of new
technologies. As Freeman (1987) puts it, “a change of techno-
economic paradigm accentuates these types of comparative
advantagessince the leading country is capable of exporting a
wide range of new and improved goods and services with
performance characteristics and costs which are generally
superior to those competitors. The laggard countries, on the
other hand, who are slow lo realise and to adopt the new
paradigm, are geared to a pattern of production and exports




It should be noted, however, that some niches of “natural
products” stil present significant growth opportunities as a
result of rise in personal income in developed countries. This
includes quality foodstuff and other fine non-durable goods,
typically consumed by populations enjoying higher standards
ofliving. The recent economic recovery ofChile wasbased on the
exports of wine andfresh fruits, while in Brazil products like
orange juice and leather shoes are among the fast growing
export items. However, competitiveness in these industries also
requires the introduction ofnewtechnologiesin orderto ensure
high quality and low costs. Actually, exporting fresh fruits
aggregates more value than processed fruits, since quality
management requirements on production, storing, and
transportation are much higher.
ij) International trade is growing mainly inside regional trading
blocks
Trade within regional blocks is playing an increasingly
importantrole in international trade. As table 4 shows, almost
60% of the European Community countries exports occur
inside the region, against only a third in 1960. Thus,the image
of Europeasa set of countries that have opened themselvesto
the global economy maynotbe appropriate as a decription of
their pattern of trade.
Regional tradingis alsolikely to playan importantroleforthe
othertwo world economic superpowers: USAwith the proposed
inclusion ofMexico in the NorthAmerican FreeTradeAgreement
andJapan dueto the strengtheningofbilateral and multilateral
trade agreementswith Asian countries, including theAssociation
ofSouth EastPacific States. Financialand industrialinvestments
are now booming and reinforcing regional trade ties. SinceJapan becamethe major economicplayerin Asia, trade within
Asia has grown faster than trade between Asia and otherregions. As Japan moves awayfrom the low end of consum
goods marketit opens a niche for otherAsian countries exports,
20
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Table 4
Intraunion trade as a percentage of total exports, 1960-87
Economic Union 1960 1970 1980 1987
European Community 34.6 48.9 52.8 58.8
Association of South-East Pacific States 21.7 14.7 17.8 17.7
Caribbean Community 4.5 7.3 6.4 6.3
Central American Common Market 7.5 26.8 22.0 11.9
Latin American Free Trade Area 7.7 10.2 13.5 11.3
Andean Group 0.7 2.3 3.5 3.2
West African Economic Community 2.0 2.3 3.5 3.2
 
Source: World Bank (1991:107)
Regional trading blocs may hinderthe goal of a more open
global trading system,since the favorable conditionsoffered to
their participants may result in the exclusion of non-member
countries. Tradingblocslinking developing countries onlysuch
as the Andean Group,the Caribbean Community and the West
African Economic Community produced only limited results
(see table 4), since participating countries have a similar
pattern ofeconomic specialization. Thus, they can neither find
customers for their major exports within the bloc or acquire
much needed import products from it. .
The Mercosul, a recently created regional trading blocjoining
together Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay is now
booming in regional trade, but sooneror laterit will face the
problem of not being linked with a major world partner which
could play a more complementary role in trade.
iii) Foreign trade and investmentarestill a limited part ofthe
GDP
Foreign trade is becoming increasingly importantpartofthe
economic activities ofmostcountries, However,itstill represents
a relatively small part of advanced industrial countries’ GNP
(see table 5) where the internal market are the stil the main
21
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target for local firms. With the exception of Canada, where
geographical, political and economical links with the USA
favoured exports, large “continental” countries present a
relatively low exports/GNP ratio. This is the case of Brazil,
China, India and USAwhere exports represent less than 15% of
GNP.
Table 5
Exports as part of the Gross Domestic Productin selected
countries, 1989, millions of dollars.
 
Country/Region Exports GDP Exp/GDP (%)
LatinAmerica
Argentina 9,567 53,070 18.0
Mexico 22,975 200,730 11.4
Brazil 34,392 319,150 10.7
Asia
Korea Rep. 62,283 211,880 29.4
Indonesia 21,773 93,970 23.2
Malaysia 25,053 37,480 66.8
China 52,538 417,830 12.5
Advanced
Japan 275,040 2,818,520 9.8
United States 346,948 5,156,440 6,7
 
 
Source: World Bank (1991:208 and 230).
Porter (1990) found, based onastudyofsuccessful industries
in ten leading countries, that domestic competition was a ke
to global success. Firms usually become internationall
competitive after developing competitive advantages and
economiesofscale domestically. The implication for develo ;
countries is that developing a competitive internal market ping
be an essential condition for successful manufactured ook,
exports, at least in sectors which depend on economies ofse,ale
22
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orrequire arelativelylonglearning period. SomeAsiancountries
such as Malaysia, Honk-Kong and Singapore constitute a
special case since their industrialization processwas not based
on import-substitution. Rather, they took advantage of their
long-standingtradingtradition to attract export-oriented foreign
. capital.
Unilateral trade liberalization per se is no guarantee of a
beneficial integration within the world economysince linking to
the new techno-economic paradigm is not a “natural” process
for developing countries. Those which do no adapt to the
changingrole of products and technology will be increasingly
marginalized from world trade and investment. Liberal policies
mayhelp gain accessto certain equipmentand consumergoods
but are not enough to improve competition. Successful
integration with the global economy may require selective and
flexible governmentintervention in order to induce local firms
to modernize and become more export oriented. Korea and
Japan are prominent examples of successful intervention
combinedwithexport orientation.Adoptingprotectionistpolicies
without demanding international competitiveness may help
infant industries to take off but may also hinder long term
prospects if the industry remains sheltered for too long.
The Technology Challenge
In the production realm, the new paradigm involvesradical
changesinbothtechnologyandorganization . Globalcompetition
intensified the search for alternatives to the traditional Fordist
and Taylorist manufacturing methods which have exhausted
their productivity growth potential.Anew innovation trajectory
based onthe applicationofmicroelectronics, neworganizational
techniques and cooperation with Suppliers and clients is now
being pursued by most manufacturing firms worldwide, after
the success ofleading Japanese firms such as Toyota. Much
has been written aboutthe new industrial practices and their
implementation,andits not the intention ofthis paperto review
them (2). However,for the purpose ofanalysing the implications
of the new manufacturing challenge for governmentpolicies,
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reference will be made to the major technological and
organizational changes which are now underway.
The new production paradigm is often associated with the
use of information technologies and automated equipment.
Unlike many technologies which are specific to a particular
processor area in manufacturing, information technology is a
pervasive technology (Bessant, 1991). It can be applied in
almostall sectors of economic activity andin differet phases of
the production chain. In manufacturing it facilitates and
increases the efficiency of a wide range of information-based
operationslike P&D, monitoring and control includingproduction
planning, sales order processing, purchasing, production
scheduling, transport, quality management, and customer
services.In the service sectoril has been increasingly applied
in banking,ratail sales, general management, government and
communicationservices. Actually it is almost impossible to find
a single sector whichis notpotentially affected by information
technology.
But simply buying the technology does not produce sound
productivity impacts. Successful introduction of automation
usually require parallel organizational changesto cope with the
characteristics of the equipment, layout, and the need to carry
out the job in a morecreative form in order to simultaniously
improve quality, reduce costs and delivery time, and increase
product innovation. Some techniqueslike “just-in-time and
total quality control have become “a paradigm”as result of
their tremendoussuccessin improving produtivity and quality
and in lowering costs. Modernizingtechniques, however, require
certain conditions to be successfully introduced. Among the
requirementsof the emerging production paradigm raised by
two issueswill be highlighted for theirimportance for government
policies: skill requirements and work organization.
Skill Requirements
New lechnologies are usually com
levels of skill. Firms introducing new t
qualified personnel able not only to e
plex and demand higher
echnologies require morexecute the work but also
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to think andresolve problems.In mostindustrial sectors there
is an increased need for engineers, technicians and other
qualified staff and a decline in the numberof unskilled and
semi-skilled workers in manufacturing.
Anotherkey feature has beena trend towards moreflexibility
in the patterns of work andskill distribution. In order to ajust
to market changes and support increasingly integrated
technologies there is a shift from single skills towards multiple
skills. A multiskilled worker can be moreflexible in changing
duties thus responding to the frequent shifts in work demand
which characterize any work environment. Another important
advantage ofmultiple skilled workers is their capacity to better
understand the whole manufacturing process and thusbe able
to contribute to the improvementof quality and productivity.
This can be achieved by participating in quality controlcircles,
trouble-shooting groups and other participative techniques.
From the worker's point ofview acquiringdifferentskills is less
monotonousthan always performing the samejobs.Typically,
multiskilled workers have a career plan and salaries are not
related directly to what function they actually do but ratherto
their employment time and general work performance.
The major consequence for government policies of this
greaterreliance on higher qualified and multiskilled workers is
the need to expand and improve education and trainning. There
is a growing recognition that education improves productivity
and growth. A better educated person usually absorbs new
information faster and applies unfamiliar inputs and new
processes more effectively. In the present waveofrapid technical
change, much needsto be learned about how to operate and
maintain new equipment, understand new formsof qualitity
control and organization techniques. A survey conducted by
Ferraz et al (1992) with 130 leading manufacturing firms in
Brazil concluded that the mostrelevant attributes for flexible
automation for over 80% of the sample were rational logic, the
ability to learn new skills and general technical knowledge.
Motor co-ordination and manual dextery,on the contrary, were
considered importantby less than 25%ofthe interviewedfirms.
Asfar as skills characteristics required for the introduction of
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new organization Lechniques suchastotal quality control and
just-in-time are concerned, the attributes thought to be of
fundamental importance byat least 75% ofthe sample were the
initiative to resolve problems,identification with the objectives
of the firm, the ability to obtain new qualifications, taking
responsability for production processes, and rational logic.
Again,those altribules thoughtto be least relevant were motor
co-ordination and manual dextery.
Unlike taylorist production methods,where the majorsource
of workers'skill acquisition is on-the-job training, in the new
paradigm skills are acquired mainly through formal education.
New organizational techniques suchastotal quality control
require basic knowledgeofstatistics and other skills which are
more dependent upon the general educational level of the
workforce. Vocational training also play an important
complementary role. But since technology is changingfast, a
worker mustacquire capabilities that will help him to continuouly
learn throughouthislife. Usually, short-term vocational training
simply teaches how to operate existing tools and equipment
which are bound to becomeobsolete soonerorlater.
Work Organization
The “mass production” paradigm based on semi-skilled
labour and multi-levels of hierarchy is associated with q
managementstyle whichis biased towards centralised commandand top-down control (Ferraz et al, 1992). In that systemworkersare askedto perform their duties under established setof rules and tight control. The new paradigm, in contrastrequires models of work organization which permit, accordingto Bessant (1991:315) a degree of local autonomy and selforganization, a highlevel of functional flexibilit
team rather than individual work. Y and group or
The emerging patternsof work org
changes in institutional culture. Often, ma







Industrial Policies ina Changing World: Brazilian Transition to the New Paradigm
do not require major organizational changes, thus avoiding
conflicts amonghierarchicallevels. But institutions must face
this challenge if higher standards of quality and smaller
inventories and waste are to be achieved. Problemsof quality
mustbe solved at sourceand,in order to do so, employees must
have freedom andflexibility to search for solutions rather then
passing the problemson. In manyJapanesefactories, assembly
workers have the powerto stop the productionline if they find
quality problems. This of course requires a certain degree of
stability and goodwill between the firm and their employees
whichis not usually present in western organizations. The table
below summarizes major shifts concerningthe traditional and
the new paradigm in work organization and control.
Table 6
Thetraditional vs. the new paradigm in Work Organization and Control
 
Traditional New Paradigm
Control and Bureaucratic, centralized Informal control mechanism,
Structure control via formal rules with central goalsetting,co-
and procedures ordination and participatory
decision-making
Single top-downline of Network communication
command with vertical
communication
Cascadeof supervisory local autonomy andself
levels control
Stable pyramid growing Flat flexible network of
n height and complexity agile units/remainsflat
as it expands as it expands
Work Clearvertical links and Interactive, co-operative













4. The Role ofthe State in Development: The Case ofBrazil
This section examinestherole of the state in the industrial
development of Brazil. The analysis shows that policies were
successful in transforming Brazilian economyfrom an agrarian
to an integrated anddiversified industrial base. From 1946 to
1987, the share ofmanufactured products in total exports rose
from 7.4% to 50%. However, two major aspects deserveacritical
assessment:first, due to a critical shortageofforeign currency,
governmentpolicies have been strongly biased towards import-
substitution. Lately, pressed by the international economy
globalization trend, the governmenthasstarted to dismantle
the existing protectionist and regulatory framework but have
‘not yet implemented new policies capable of increasing the
competitiveness ofBrazilian industry. Second, Brazil has faced
macroeconomic disorder, characterized by very high inflation
rates, Othermajortopicswillemergefromthe historical analysis,
bearing in mind the relationship between governmentpolicies
and industrial and technological development.
This section is divided into three parts according to the
period studied. Thefirst refers to the early industrialization
process, which goes from World War II to the late GOs. The
second period starts in 1968, when the Strategic Development
Planwas putin force, to 1979 andwillbe refered to as the “70's”.
The last part refers to the period from 1980 to now. Although
importantchanges ingovernmentpolicies have beenintroduced
since 1990, there are not yet a clear industrial development
Strategy to deserve a separate discussion.
Early Import-Substitution: The Pre-1968 period
From the Second World War onwards,the role and structure
of the Brazilian State was deeply transformed. The successivecrises which shaked the Brazilian economy since the great
depression, pointed at the extreme fragility of a development
model based on primary exports(Tigre, 1978: 120). At this timethe dominant international paradigm was baseq on the
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diffusion of the use of electricity, and mass production of
consumer goods. Aiming at developing these industries the
Brazilian state under Getulio Vargas government established
state-ownedfirms like FabricaNacionalde Motores (combustion
engine manufacturing) in 1940 and Cia Siderirgica Nacional
(steel) in 1941. In these initiatives the state provided not only
the required capital, organization, and institutional framework
but also played an active role in international politics in order
to assure the technology transfer needed. This included
negotiationswith the pre-warGermangovernmentin a strategy
designedto create an alternative to American technology, since
the American governmentwasreluctant to support Brazilian
industrialization.
During the War, the shortage of imported goodslike petrol,
capital goods, and other inputs led the governmentto create the
“Coordination for Economic Mobilization” which,in fact, acted
as a superministry. According to Ianni (1971), this wasthefirst
governmentplanningexperiencein Brazil. Multiannualplanning
becameanimportantinstrumenttosupportthe industrialization
processin the next three decades.This included building up the
required infra-structure(electricity generation and roads) and
providing protection and incentives to attract private capital,
both local and foreign, to produce automobils and durable
consumer goods. The results were impressive: from 1945 to
1975 industrial growth averaged 8.8 percent a year; percapita
income increased by 4 percent annually; and agricultural:
output showed an yearly increase of 5.6% - all in real terms
(Gereffi, 1990).
In the mid-fifties, influenced by the structuralist arguments
favouring industrialization, the Kubitschek government
launched the “Targets Plan” (1956-61), a collection of five-year
targets for output and investmentin infra-structure, heavy
industry, food and education.Theplanrelied heavilyon external
financing (through suppliers credits) and foreign direct
investment. | In order to attract FDI the governmentnot only
dropped all existing restrictions on remittances of profits,
interest and dividends butalso granteda preferential overvalued
exchangerate to foreign loans and investment (Moreira, 1993).
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Other importantpolicy measures introd, ucedin the lateboost manufacturing investmentin selected sectors, werea
exportorientationwould have allowed
of the limits of the internal market Growth to goonMultinational affiliates were gi
and technology notwithstanding the industry’rechnological and skill requirements, The technology’questionnot completely ingnored in the Target Plan (1956/60) and
re refto the problem rather than a real intention to incorporate
of government action.  
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industrialization”. A short period of reforms designed to cope
with the inadequacy of the financial system and to promote
exportswere followed inthe 1970sbyanewimport-substitution
phase.
Secondary Import-Substitution Phase: the 1970's
In the 70's, Brazil entered a secondary industrialization
phase aimingatreducingits dependenceonintermediarygoods
imports such as petrochemicals,fertilizers, capital goods, pulp
and paper and non-ferrous metals. Import substitution would
eventualy include technology developmentas part ofa strategy
developed to increase “national autonomy”. Three suscessive
developmentplans - Targets and Basis for GovernmentAction
(1970/71) and the Ist and IInd National Development Plans
(1972/74 and 1975/79) detailed these policies. The plans
followed reforms in public and private sector financing(3) and
the trade and foreign capital regime by introducing exports
incentives and a selective import liberalization policy (4). After
the oil shock in 1973, however, the import liberalization policy
was abandoned.
It should be noted that the development strategy was not
based on import-susbtitutions only. Rather, it put much
emphasis on export promotion aiming at both diversifying and
increasing the volumes of exports. At this time the country
began to expandboth its commodity exports (soybeans, orange
juice, minerals) and its manufactured exports (steel, apparel,
footwear, transport equipment) thus deepening the
industrialization process. Stimulated bysubsidised credits and
tax exemptions, manufactured exports increased their
percentageoftotal exports from 5.3% in 1964 to 24.1% in 1974.
In that period, known as the economic “miracle”, GDP grew at
an average annual rate of 10%. Examining trade regimes
adopted by Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Taiwan, Bradford Jr.
(1990) argu¢sthattheyall fit the export push model more than
either the import substitution regime attributed to the Latin
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consequence, from 1974 to 1979 the external debt trebled to
US$ 50 billion, while short term internal debt was also
substantially increased (Moreira, 1993:30).
for technology policies, the 1970’s was characterized by a
greateremphasis on technology. The countrywas seen bypolicy
makers as too dependenton foreign technology . They believed
that industrial development would only succeed ifsustained by
internal forces. Technologyproduction wasseenaslate phase
of the import-substitution process. According to Guimaraes
(1993) this approach dominated technology policy during the
70’s and 80’s. He claimsthat the project had limited support
from the industrial private sector and was basically oriented
towards the academic community and state research centres.
A positive result was a large expansion of technological
capabilities through investmentin higher education andpost-
graduate programs.
There are conflicting interpretations among economists on
the results ofthis second import-substitution industrialization
phase. Those more favourable to the strategies adopted claim
that economic growth and exports were keptat a relatively high
level. More important, however, was the successful
implementation of new heavy industry such as rolled steel,
aluminium, petrochemical, paper pulp and capital goods
industries. Castro and Souza (1985:36) claim that these efforts
were crucial to structually changing the unbalanced Brazilian
industry, which was too vulnerable to external crisis, and this
could notbe achieved by simply restricting public spending and
economic growth. Batista (1992:149) argues that indebtedness
was essential to mantain growth and industrialization. “Given
the rigidities in the structure ofproduction and consumptionof
the Brazilian economy and the external restrictions for the
development of additional export earnings, an adjustment
strategy in response to the first oil shock solely based on
expenditure reducing and switching policies would have been
extremely costly in termsof real absortion and outputlosses”.
In fact, Brazil became a net exporter of capital goods and
intermediate products in the followingdecade, due to subsidized
private and public investments in import-substitution
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undertaken duringtheII NDP. The. se high costs hbasis for critical responses to the plan. They drawattentinnfherostytmacroeconomic “side-effects” like the huge-externalerotan nee30eecnetsricriorated public sectorfinance: “the incentive regi ;be largely non-selective, biased towards theinternalmee?
uStrializatievelop a large resouce-based industry,
the new techno-
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Thisperiodsawnolonglastingsolution foreconomic problems.
The balance of payment remainedpositive, due to new import
restrictions which banned pratically all non-essential imports
and increases in manufacturing exports after the maturation
ofprevious investmentin intermediate goods processingplants.
The trade surplus was entirely absorbed by the external debt
service and Brazil shifted from importer to exporter of capital.
In the 1980's trade surplus averaged 2.6% ofGNP a year while
external debtwaskeptleveled atUS$ 115billion. As to inflation,
it soon reached the four digit stage as orthodox adjustment
policies adoptedin the early 80’s gave way to heterodox policies
after the democratization process. Actually, this period is not
short of policies at all. A survey conducted by the business
newspaper Gazeta Mercantil (1991) found that from 1980 to
1990 there were eight different inflation stabilisation plans,
fifteen different policies towardswages, eighteen changesin the
rules regulating foreign exchange,fifty-four changesin the rule
controlling prices, twenty-one different proposals on the
negotiation of foreign debt, four different currencies, nineteen
decrees related to cuts in public expenditure, eleven separate
indexes for calculating the devaluation of local currency and
five wages andprice freezes (5) Ferraz et al (1992) addtothislist
11 changes of Finance Minister.
The impact of such an unstable economic environment on
industrial development was debilitating. From 1981 to 1990
manufacturing industry decreased 1.2% while GDP percapita
fell 6%. As the internal market collapsed, the overprotected
local industry was not prepared to take on the international
market. Therole of the federal governmentin the economy was
substantially reduced as a result of public finance troubles.
From 1980 to 1990, the share of federal government-owned
enterprises in total investment had fallen from 4.6% to 1.7% of
the GNP. The operational incomeofthe governmentproductive
sector represented about 16% ofGNP in 1986 but decreasedto
10.5% in 1990 (Serra e Afonso, 1993:37).
The fall in public productive investmentin Brazil, estimated
as 50% bteween 1981 and 1991, may be a symptom of the
general economiccrisis, rather than an explicit policy towards
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irthe size of the state. From 1981 onwards, it becameansn possible to obtain foreign credits for newinvestmentsuet ane ebtcrisis. Internal sourcesalso became very scarcein public firmeantiThadfatally reduceddirect investment
elr accessto privateorthefunsuccessful) effort to curb inflation, State-ownedfensBOs oe ected by a decline on real tariffs. For example,in theabout B08The for telecommunications services went down2 50% thus reducing the self-financing capacity of thelebras system. pacity of the
_A moreexplicit policy towards privatization began in 1990pith heCollorgovernment(followed y Itamar Franco after his
n Peac ment) and up to now several major state-ownedanulacturing companies have been taken over by privatecroups. These include Usiminas and Companhia SiderurgicaAncional (CSN), the two largest integrated steel plants in Southamerica, and most of the state shares in petrochemical and
zer companies, Privatization is seen as a goal in itself
desregarding the adverse conditions in which the transfer is
takingplace (6). Despite the presentuneasy economic situation
which dampensprivate sector willingness to participate more
actively in the privatization program,thegovernmentisplanning
to sell electricity, teleeommunications and other public utility
companies.
Significant changes emerged in the early 90s’ concerning
import and investmentbarriers. The long-standing practice of
using import licensesas a nontariffbarrier to protect domestic
industry has been abandoned. Multinational firms now have
freedom to invest and remit profits and royalties. Firms wishing
to establish new plants no longer have to obtain permission
from the Industrial Policy Council and demandsestablishing a
minimum level oflocally purchased components and requiring
technology transfer have been removed. Foreign investmentis
still prohibited in petroleum production and refining, public
utilities, media and other sectors, but restrictions are likely to
be reduced in the next constitutional review. A new patentlaw,
granting more protection to industrial property and extending
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Congress. Brazil is now accepting most of the demandsof the
US Governmentto recognize intellectual property and to open
the economyfor foreign trade and investment.
The liberalization of the Brazilian economy included the
information technologysector, the laststronghold ofindependent
technology policy in Brazil. The IT policy managed to “put
national interests first” (Bastos, 1992:239) by excluding direct
foreign investment in some areas ofthe professional electronics
industry. The results ofthis policy are well documented (Evans,
Frischtak and Tigre, 1992; Schmitz and Cassiolato, 1992) and
evaluations are mostly favourable. But import liberalization
has severely affected local technological development and
manufacturing activities.
In short, Brazil is already adopting a neo-liberal policy. The
argumentbeingmadehereis that although in manycasesthese
reforms were needed,the results will not contribute to a more
flexible and efficient state. The price has been high. From 1990
to 1992 per capita GDP decreased from US$ 3,338 to $ 2,823
while unemploymentrate increased from 4.28% to 6.21%. The
state is now unarticulated and lacks confidence to develop new
policies. Personnel are underpaid and no re-skilling schemeis
being considered. The new techno-economic paradigm requires
the state to undergo a processof “creative destruction”. What
we have nowis destruction without creation.
5- Changing State Strategies
Government intervention has played a central role in
promoting the industrialization of Brazil, since market forces
alone would not encourageprivate investmentin risky and long
term manufacturing activities. Brazil is now among the ten
most industrialized countries in the World. During the 60s and
the 70s, despite the pitfalls of governmentintervention, often
leading to wrong incentives, policy making capabilities and
leadership were available in key state institutions. In the last
fifteen years however, government capacity to formulate and
implement spund industrial and macroeconomic policies has
deteriorated substantially. This section will summarize major
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Inward Orientation and Export Promotion
The industrialization pattern of Brazil can notbestri
ctly
defined as inward oriented, because export promotion
policies
have been adopted since the late 1960s. Howeve
r, in a
comparative perspective with other developingcountries
Brazil
has presented an anti-export bias. Import substitution wa
s not
disciplined by international prices and the wide range of
protectionist policies adopted to face foreign exchange
restrictions have encouraged a non-selective industrializa
tion.
Consequently, the competitiveness of local products has
been
negatively affected by the use of a high proportion ofloca
lly-
purchased inputs irrespectively to their costs,quality,
delivery
time or adaptability to customer's needs. Essential im
ports
were chargedwithhigh tariffs and nontariffs barriers, incl
uding
a complete ban on imports when local production of sim
ilar
products existed, long import licenses approval delays, l
ong
term import credits requirements, and other “punishmen
ts”to
importers. Export promotion policies usually attacked these
distortions by creating duty drawback schemes and subsidie
s
to reimburse exporters for tariffs paid on inputs. But these
compensatory schemesoffset only part ofthe anti-export bias.
Subsidies created public financial problems and were often
allocated to favored sectors and economic groups,lending to
rent-seeking.
In sum, the wideprotectionist policies adopted in Brazil have
not created a favourable environment for exports. With the
exeption ofinformationtechnology, multinationalswere granted
protection without any export performance requirement. Also,
overprotectionledtolarge price distortions in favourofproduction
for domestic market. Changing these policies towards a more
open and export oriented trade regime is a major challenge for
Brazil. The constrasting experiences of trade liberalization
adoptedbySouthern LatinAmerican countries onthe one hand
and EastAsian nationson the other, can provide guidancefor
Brazilian futurepolicies.The orthodoxneo-liberal policyadopted
byArgentina, Chile and Uruguay during the 70s have provoked
extensive desindustrialization and high social and political
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ree.andcotauently is not an adequate model to Brazil. The(anda: ategy adopted by South Korea based on selectivemporary) importliberalization isfarmore successful
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protection without overcoming key structural problems can
lead to desindustrialization.
Aneo-Schumpeterian approach,bycontrast, would intervene
in the sourceofthe (market) distortion. Forexample, to subsidize
education and skill acquisition rather than use long term
protection whenthe problem is lack ofhuman capital. Also, for
international political considerations, government structural
are preferable than subsidies for industrial firms since explicit
export subsidies are becoming more vulnerableto retaliation,
mainly from the USA. Understandingthe needsofeach sector
is essential, since differenteconomic activities demanddifferent
endowmentofskills, technology, acess to capital goods, inputs,
credit and phisical infra-structure. Table 8 below explore
technological and strategic needs of major sectors of the
Brazilian industry.
Table 8
Critical Resources, Impacts of Globalization, Key Innovations and
Strategic Needs in Major Export Sectors of Brazilian Economy.
 
 
Sector Critical Globaliz. Key Strategic
Resources Impacts Innovations Needs
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As far as technology is concerned, governmentpolicies have
been largely unarticulated with industry needs. The available
resources have been oriented towards R&D, mainly conducted
by public institutions. Recently, however, somesteps have been
taken to promote quality and productivity through technology
diffusion. Existing programs (7) aim at increasing industry
awarness on quality requirements but lack the appropriate
mechanisms and resources to support technology diffusion.
The diffusion ofnew technologies and organizational processes
throughout the production chain is essential to systemic
competitition, since competitiveness can not be achieved with
low quality and unreliable input suppliers. Innovation through
industrial R&D must also be encouragedsince innovation and
diffusion are never entirely separable.
As the international experience shows,the private sector can
participate in the developmentofinfra-structure. Privatization
and deregulation of public monopolies such as
telecommunications andelectricityhave attracted private capital
worldwide. We must recognize, however, that in a country
where the population is largely poor, the market can only play
complementary role in the provision of public services.
Role ofgovernment
There is a growing recognition that the state must reduceits
participation in the economyeither by privatizing state-owned
firms or reducing its interference over economic activities
throughderegulation. State-ownedfirmsaretipicallyless flexible
than private firms to reestructureits activities to cope with
technology change and competition. They played an important
role in developing new sectors which wereeither too risky or
required an amountof investment beyond private financial
capacity. But the new paradigm requires capabilities like
innovative capacity, flexibility and a type of organizational
structure that can be better achieved by private firms. Also,
privatization is a way to save public moneyto social needs.
However,deregulation andmarketfreedomdoesnoteliminate
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Notes
(1) The expression Is Toye's (1987)
(2) For a reviewon newmanulacturing techniques see Schonberger 1986;
Bessant, 1991. Ferrazetal (1992) analyses thedifficulties and opportunities
for diffusing these techniques in Brazil.
(3) The financial sector reform included a fiscal reform to modernise taxes
and protect fiscal revenue from inflation, adjunting state enterprises’
prices and the establishmentofcompulsorysaving fundsforinvestiments
in infra-structure and housing, in addition to the creation of a central
bank.In the private financial sector, new non-banking institutions were
created and old ones reformed (Moreira, 1993:19).
(3) "On the exportside, manufactured exportwere exempted from indirect
and income taxes, granted product-specific fiscal subsidies, a system of
drawback was implemented, and heavily subsidised export credits were
madeavailable" (Moreira, 1993:21).
(5) Brazilians becameso frightened ofeconomic “packages”that recently
a tour operator fearing bad publicity announcedthathis companywill no
longer use the word “package” to describe its tours.
(6) In April 1993, CSN wassold by public auction for only US$ 1 billion,
97% ofwhich waspaid in “rotten currency”, an expression created at the
stock exchangerefering to long term or unpald public debt bonds which
are priced in the market at less than one-third of their face value . The
estimated investmentneeded to build a similar plant, by contrast, is US$
12 billion Jornaldo Brasil, 11/3/93) and the companyts actually making
profits.
(7) The Brazilian Program for Quality and Productivity (PBQP) was
introduced in 1990.
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